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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE—A CONSTITUTIONAL 
BARRIER TO SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND THE LOCAL FOOD 
MOVEMENT 
Better food—more local, more healthy, more sensible—is a 
powerful new topic of the American conversation.  It reaches from 
the epicurean quarters of Slow Food convivia to the matter-of-fact 
Surgeon General’s Office; from Farm Aid concerts to school lunch 
programs.  From the rural routes to the inner cities, we are staring at 
our plates and wondering where that’s been.  For the first time since 
our nation’s food was ubiquitously local, the point of origin now 
matters again to some consumers.  We’re increasingly wary of an 
industry that puts stuff in our dinner we can’t identify as animal, 
vegetable, mineral, or what.1 
INTRODUCTION 
As sustainable agriculture2 has become increasingly popular, many 
state and local governments have joined the movement by creating Food 
Policy Councils in an effort to promote sustainable practices in food 
 
1. BARBARA KINGSOLVER WITH STEVEN L. HOPP & CAMILLE KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL, 
VEGETABLE, MIRACLE 17 (2007). 
2. Congress defines sustainable agriculture as: 
an integrated system of plant and animal production practices having a site-specific 
application that will, over the long-term— 
(A) satisfy human food and fiber needs; 
(B) enhance environmental quality and the natural resource base upon which the 
agriculture economy depends; 
(C) make the most efficient use of nonrenewable resources and on-farm resources 
and integrate, where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls; 
(D) sustain the economic viability of farm operations; and 
(E) enhance the quality of life for farmers and society as a whole. 
7 U.S.C. § 3103(19) (2006).  For more information on the history and use of the term in a 
regulatory context, see Mary V. Gold, Sustainable Agriculture: Information Access Tools, 
USDA NAT’L AGRIC. LIB. (July 18, 2012), http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/agnic/sus 
ag.shtml. 
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production.3  There is a great need for governmental support and 
encouragement of the sustainable agriculture movement because there 
are serious environmental and economic problems that have arisen due 
to the industrialization of agriculture over the past several decades.4  The 
federal government has long supported industrial practices in 
agriculture, and it is unlikely that a sudden shift in federal policy is on 
the horizon.5  State governments have an important interest in 
encouraging sustainable food production on a local level.6 
A constitutional doctrine known as the dormant Commerce Clause 
stands in the way of states wishing to promote sustainable agriculture.7  
As an implied negative aspect of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution,8 courts use the dormant Commerce Clause to 
strike down state actions that interfere with interstate commerce.9  To 
test10 whether a state act is invalid under this doctrine, courts first 
determine if the act is discriminatory on its face,11 in its purpose,12 or in 
its effect.13  If it is found to be discriminatory against out-of-state 
 
3. See CFSC LIST OF FOOD POLICY COUNCILS IN NORTH AMERICA, 1-67 (May 2012), 
available at http://www.markwinne.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/fp-councils-may-
2012.pdf.  The burgeoning Food Policy Councils may look to resources such as this Note and 
the Good Laws, Good Food Toolkit for guidance in implementing policies that will promote 
sustainable agriculture in their communities.  See THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FOOD LAW 
AND POLICY CLINIC, GOOD LAWS, GOOD FOOD: PUTTING STATE FOOD POLICY TO WORK 
FOR OUR COMMUNITIES (2012). 
4. See infra note 27. 
5. See infra Part I.B. 
6. See infra Part I.D. 
7. Other potential constitutional barriers exist, but they are outside the scope of this 
Note. 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
9. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (explaining that the reason the 
Constitution gives complete authority over interstate commerce to Congress is “to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and 
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation”). 
10. Note that there is not agreement on whether a clear test has been employed by 
courts.  In fact, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has been criticized for its unpredictability.  
See Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 221 (1997) (“[I]t might be well for courts to ask 
whether current tests serve as accurate shortcuts for imputing either protectionist or 
nonprotectionist effect to legislative enactments.”). 
11. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (1979) (explaining that “facial discrimination by itself may 
be a fatal defect”). 
12. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977) (inferring 
that the discriminatory impact of a statute “was not an unintended byproduct” but rather the 
motivation for state legislators). 
13. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (explaining that 
discriminatory effect can be sufficient to compel dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny).  See 
Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
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interests, it is considered “virtually per se invalid,”14 and then may be 
upheld only if the legislation substantially serves a legitimate state 
interest and there is no less discriminatory alternative to achieve the 
local goal.15  Economic protectionism is the presumed motivation behind 
discriminatory legislation, and it is always an impermissible intention.16  
If an act is not discriminatory, but it nonetheless interferes with interstate 
commerce, a balancing test is used to establish constitutionality by 
determining whether the out-of-state burdens outweigh the in-state 
benefits.17  Despite the chilling effect of this doctrine that limits the 
ability of state governments to experiment with sustainability where 
interstate commercial activity is involved, it is likely that legislation, if 
carefully crafted to support sustainable agriculture, can survive 
constitutional challenges.18 
Part I of this Note will discuss the goals of the sustainable 
agriculture movement and how they relate to federalism.  Part I.A will 
 
1203, 1239-45 (1986) (describing the three types of discrimination recognized by courts). 
14. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994) (“‘[D]iscrimination’ simply means different treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce 
is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”). 
15. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353-54.  See also Smith, supra note 13, at 1231 (“It is settled 
Supreme Court doctrine that if a regulation is discriminatory, the state bears the burden of 
justifying it.  First, the state must prove that it has a legitimate interest to be served by the 
regulation.  Second, it must show that the regulation serves this interest to a substantial extent.  
Third, it must prove that it has no available alternatives to the regulation that are less 
discriminatory.”).  There is a major exception under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
that applies to situations in which a state is acting as a market participant, but the exception is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  See South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 
82, 93 (1984) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a 
market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities.”).  This 
exception applies to local procurement statutes that compel state organizations to prefer food 
produced within the state when making purchases.  See Amy S. Ackerman, Buy Healthy, Buy 
Local: An Analysis of Potential Legal Challenges to State and Local Government Local 
Purchase Preferences, 43 URB. LAW. 1015, 1019-22 (2011) (discussing how the market 
participant exception applies to state procurement statutes that favor local sourcing). 
16. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949) (“[A] state may 
not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate 
commerce.”); cf. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626-27 (“[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in 
legislative means as well as legislative ends . . . . we assume [each state] has every right to 
protect its residents’ pocketbooks as well as their environment . . . [b]ut whatever [the State’s] 
ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce 
coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat 
them differently.”). 
17. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
18. See infra Part III. 
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define sustainable agriculture, while Part I.B will show how federal 
regulation and industrial agriculture are closely connected.  Part I.C will 
discuss the relationship between small farms and sustainability.  Part I.D 
will argue that many of the problems addressed by the sustainable 
agriculture movement fall within the police power of local and state 
governments.  Part II will analyze the relationship between the dormant 
Commerce Clause and the movement towards agricultural sustainability.  
Part II.A will explain how the dormant Commerce Clause treats state 
policies with respect to agriculture, and then Part II.B will compare how 
the doctrine is applied to other industries, emphasizing how the 
treatment of different industries is unequal.  Part III of this Note will 
discuss and analyze a variety of actual and hypothetical state efforts to 
promote sustainable agriculture through the lens of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, arguing that the doctrine should be interpreted to 
allow such policies. 
I. SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FEDERALISM 
A. What Is Sustainable Agriculture? 
In attempting to realize the goals of sustainable agriculture,19 an 
elusive and amorphous term, advocates have pursued a variety of 
approaches.20  The commercially popular organic food movement21 has 
been particularly successful in providing food to consumers that is 
grown without the use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.22  The 
 
19. See supra note 2. 
20. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & The Environment: Informational and 
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2011) 
(discussing the possibility of “[a]n ‘alternative’ food system [that] would incorporate organic 
foods, eco-labeled foods, direct marketing, fair trade, local foods, farmers markets, and buying 
clubs” (citation omitted)); see also Margaret Sova McCabe, Reconsidering Federalism and 
the Farm: Toward Including Local, State and Regional Voices in America’s Food System, 6 J. 
FOOD L. & POL’Y 151, 162 (2010) (“[F]ood ‘movements’ have a powerful influence on food 
systems.  These grass roots movements are important, but so too are formal efforts to engage 
local, state, and regional voices in food system reform.”). 
21. U.S. Organic Industry Overview, ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N (2011), available at 
http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/2011OrganicIndustrySurvey.pdf; see A. Bryan Endres, 
An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with Big Organics and 
Other Legal Challenges for the Industry's Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 17, 18 
(2007) (“The organics industry has entered its commercial and regulatory adolescence and 
now claims the fastest growing market share of food purchases in the United States.”). 
22. Pesticides and Food: What “Organically Grown” Means, U.S. EPA, http://www.ep 
a.gov/pesticides/food/organics.htm (last updated May 9, 2012); Claire S. Carroll, Comment, 
What Does "Organic" Mean Now? Chickens and Wild Fish Are Undermining the Organic 
Foods Production Act of 1990 (Evolution of the Legal Definition of "Organic"-Business 
Interests Must Be Stopped from Re-Defining "Organic" Contrary to the Purposes of the 
CHRIS ERCHULL  
2014] A CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER 375 
“‘Slow Food’ movement” encourages farming practices that “improv[e] 
agricultural efficiency, maintain[] cultural lifelines, and sustain[] the 
environment.”23  The Local Food movement shares many of the same 
goals, but focuses primarily on sourcing food for communities from 
nearby farms24 or from farms that sell directly to consumers.25  In 
general, local food is produced on small farms.26  Policies that support 
slow food, local food, and small farms have the potential to improve the 
impact of agriculture on our environment, health, and safety.27  These 
 
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990), 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 117, 119 (2004) 
(“In 1972, Robert Rodale, J.I.’s son, verbalized the definition of ‘organically grown’ that is 
now commonly known: ‘Food grown without pesticides; foods grown without artificial 
fertilizers.’” (citations omitted)).  Unfortunately, large organic farms share traits in common 
with industrialized agricultural practices that will be discussed in more detail infra.  See 
Czarnezki, supra note 20, at 275 (“The organic food market is flourishing, and, as a result, the 
modern organic production and distribution system is now dominated by large-scale 
‘industrial organic’ or ‘big organic’ producers.  ‘The rise of commercial and industrial 
conventions is clear in organic distribution and consumption . . . .’” (quoting Laura T. 
Raynolds, The Globalization of Organic Agro-Food Networks, 32 WORLD DEV. 725, 738 
(2004)). 
23. H. David Gold, Legal Strategies to Address the Misrepresentation of Vermont 
Maple Syrup, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 93, 95 (2004).  Slow Food USA, a nonprofit 
organization, describes its mission: “[T]o counter the rise of fast food and fast life, the 
disappearance of local food traditions and people's dwindling interest in the food they eat, 
where it comes from, how it tastes and how our food choices affect the rest of the world.”  
About Us, SLOW FOOD USA, http://www.slowfood.com/international/1/about-us (last visited 
May 13, 2014). 
24. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers 
Facing Producers of “Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 56 (2011) (“From a 
practical standpoint, the local foods movement is exactly what it sounds like: a purposeful 
effort by consumers to buy food products from farmers and producers in the cities, regions, 
and states in which they live.”). 
25. STEPHEN MARTINEZ ET AL., LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS, IMPACTS, AND 
ISSUES iii (May 2010) (defining local food by “direct-to-consumer arrangements”), available 
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/122868/err97_1_.pdf. 
26. Id. at 18 (“[S]mall farms accoun[t] for the largest number of farms engaged in direct 
sales.”). 
27. See Gail Feenstra, Chuck Ingels & David Campbell, What is Sustainable 
Agriculture?, AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY INST. AT UCDAVIS, http://www.sarep.ucdavis.edu/abo 
ut-sarep/def (last visited May 14, 2014).  “Sustainable agriculture integrates three main 
goals—environmental health, economic profitability, and social and economic equity. . . .”  Id.  
Furthermore, sustainability includes “consideration of social responsibilities such as working 
and living conditions of laborers, the needs of rural communities, and consumer health and 
safety both in the present and the future.”  Id; see also Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and 
Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 611-12 (2010) (“[P]esticides can . . . caus[e] contamination to 
drinking water sources, contamination of fish that humans consume, and direct skin contact ... 
in contaminated waters . . . . [Also], industrial agriculture can impact human health indirectly, 
by influencing the foods people eat.”); see also id. at 602-03 (“[I]ndustrial agriculture has led 
to . . . high-risk working and living conditions for farm laborers . . . and a decline of economic 
and social conditions in rural communities . . . . A range of industrial agricultural practices 
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policies, if implemented on a broad scale, can help to counteract some of 
the negative effects that have resulted from the industrialization of 
agriculture. 
B. Industrial Agriculture and Federal Policy 
Over the past seventy years, the federal government has gradually 
increased its control over agricultural policy.28  This coincides with, and 
has provided support to, the industrialization of agriculture.29  Along 
with efficiency in food production, industrialization has brought 
negative consequences to the environment, to human health and safety, 
and to animal welfare, culminating in its impact on climate change.30 
A period of severe drought and wind storms in the 1930s known as 
the Dust Bowl led to the implementation of federal programs that were 
meant to help farmers avoid destitution while maintaining sufficient 
food production.31  Perhaps the most significant piece of legislation to 
 
contribute to environmental harms.”); cf. Johnson & Endres, supra note 24, at 99 (“[T]he 
policy justifications supporting the notion of ‘small producer exceptionalism’ are, empirically, 
a mixed bag . . . . Given the current state of research, the big challenge for local foods 
advocates is to reconcile their best-supported argument (economics) with their least-supported 
argument (food safety).”). 
28. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra note 37. 
30. David N. Cassuto & Sarah Saville, Hot, Crowded, and Legal: A Look at Industrial 
Agriculture in the United States and Brazil, 18 ANIMAL L. 185, 186-87 (2012) (exploring the 
negative impact of industrialized agriculture). 
31. Surviving the Dust Bowl, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films 
/dustbowl/ (last visited May 14, 2014).  Policies included the Emergency Banking Act of 
1933, the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, the Farm Credit Act of 1933, and the Emergency 
Relief Appropriation Act.  Congress followed this legislation with the creation of the Soil 
Erosion Service in 1933 and implementation of the Soil Erosion Act of 1935.  Id.  
Additionally, the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, also known as the first Farm Bill, was 
meant to stabilize the agricultural industry during the Great Depression.  The shift toward 
strong federal control over the agriculture industry helped cement the role of the U.S. in the 
international agriculture market: 
Before the New Deal, politicians considered agriculture the province of the 
states.  After the New Deal, agriculture became the economic concern of the 
federal government, and it has remained so since 1937.  Before the Depression, 
no federal law existed that imposed a penalty on a farmer who saved crops for 
his own or local use rather than selling on the national or international market.  
However, the economic downturn and the needs of the national and international 
grain market ended the farmer's practice of crop saving to promote market 
stability.  As a result, the Commerce Clause (including the dormant, or negative, 
commerce clause) and the national and international market became paramount 
in agricultural policy.  Local farms, local markets, and local preferences ceded to 
the economic stability of “the unitary national market.”  Moreover, that market 
served to position the U.S. as a global trading partner. 
Margaret Sova McCabe, Foodshed Foundations: Law's Role in Shaping Our Food System's 
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come out of this national disaster was the first Farm Bill, known at the 
time as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.32  The Act introduced 
subsidies into American agricultural policy, providing relief during an 
economic and environmental crisis by decreasing market supply and 
preventing prices from plummeting.33  The Farm Bill was “well-
intentioned at the outset,” but its “subsidy program has gradually 
snowballed into a legislative package of subsidized commodities that 
increasingly benefits the largest of agricultural producers.”34 
In the decades following the first Farm Bill, prices for agricultural 
produce continued to decline as industrial efficiency transformed 
farming practices by introducing new machinery, hybridized crops, 
synthetic pesticides and fertilizers, and animal confinement methods; it 
became more difficult for small family farms to be successful.35  
Consequently, farmers “respond[ed] by reducing overhead and labor, 
and by ensuring markets for their production” and “increasing [the] size 
of farm operations.”36  Federal policy continued to evolve, controlling 
the market supply of certain crops to keep prices high, and encouraging 
the over-production of other crops to keep prices low.37  Federal policy 
goals have shifted over the decades, yet through each phase of 
development, the viability of large, industrial agribusiness continues to 
improve while small farms have all but disappeared from the nation’s 
agrarian landscape.38 
 
Future, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 578-79 (2011). 
32. See William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental 
Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
213, 219 (2009). 
[T]he 1933 Farm Bill ambitiously sought to do many things: bring crop prices 
back to stability by weaning the nation from its affinity for agricultural 
overproduction, utilize surplus crops productively to combat widespread hunger 
and provide nutritional assistance to children in the form of school lunch 
programs, implement strategies to prevent further erosion and soil loss from poor 
land conservation policies and weather events, provide crop insurance and credit 




34. Id. at 221. 
35. DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y &  MINN. 




37. Id. at 8. 
38. For a more in-depth discussion of federal farm policy and its effects on the U.S. 
agriculture industry, see Eubanks, supra note 32, at 221, and KEENEY & KEMP, supra note 35. 
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Still, the federal policies persist.  Despite some efforts at the federal 
and state levels to support small farms and sustainable agriculture,39 the 
current policy in place reflects the crisis that brought about the New 
Deal: 
It is often argued that federal U.S. agricultural program benefits are 
an anachronism, an unnecessary throwback that today’s farmers 
could and should be forced to do without.  Yet the programs 
stubbornly remain, seemingly defying gravity as they transfer tens of 
billions of dollars from taxpayers to relatively wealthy farmers. 
. . . . 
 While U.S. farm policy has changed incrementally over the past 
five decades, by many measures recent government involvement in 
agriculture is as great as it has ever been.  Agricultural policy 
persists, despite huge changes in the socioeconomic characteristics 
of U.S. farmers and farm landowners.40 
Current federal policy has the effect of favoring industrial 
production,41 which works against the success of small farms and stands 
as an obstacle to the goals of the sustainable agriculture movement.42 
C. Small Farms 
Food originating from small farms is more likely to be sustainably 
produced than food that comes from large farms, and it is also more 
likely to come from a local farm if it is produced on a small farm.43  
Small farms that sell directly to consumers not only offer immediate 
access to fresh food, but are also accountable to their communities.44  
 
39. See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo et al., Small, Slow, and Local: Essays on Building a 
More Sustainable and Local Food System, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 353, 372 (2011) (“The 2008 
Farm Bill established a process by which local farmers selling at farmers' markets may accept 
food stamps, thereby making locally grown foods more readily available to food stamp 
recipients.”). 
40. David Bullock & Jay S. Coggins, Do Farmers Receive Huge Rents for Small 
Lobbying Efforts?, in AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 146-47 (Luther G. 
Tweeten & Stanley R. Thompson eds., 2002) (citation omitted). 
41. See Eubanks, supra note 32, at 218. 
42. See infra Part I.C. 
43. See Gerard D’Souza & John Ikerd, Small Farms and Sustainable Development: Is 
Small More Sustainable?, 28 J. OF AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 73, 82 (Jul. 1996) (“[T]he 
characteristics of small farms seem to most closely resemble those of sustainable systems. . . . 
[S]mall is more sustainable than large.”), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream 
/15243/1/28010073.pdf. 
44. See Monika Roth, Overview of Farm Direct Marketing Industry Trends, AGRIC. 
OUTLOOK FORUM 1999, at 4 (Feb. 1999), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream 
/32905/1/fo99ro01.pdf (“Direct marketing gives farmers the opportunity to respond to 
consumer needs, test new products and services, explore niche markets, and measure 
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Furthermore, the carbon footprint of food production is smaller when the 
food is produced locally and on a small farm.45  But small farms are 
disappearing in the United States.46 
Federal policy has continued to support industrialized agriculture, 
despite decades of research and scholarship dedicated to informing the 
government of the imminent disappearance of the family farm from the 
landscape of the United States.47  In 1998, the United States Department 
of Agriculture’s National Commission on Small Farms produced a 
study, A Time to Act, pleading with the federal government to implement 
policies to save small family farms from extinction.48  The message was 
clear: “If we do not act now, we will no longer have a choice about the 
kind of agriculture we desire as a Nation.”49  This study was the second 
of a series, which began in 1981 with A Time to Choose,50 but at that 
time, “talking about the structure of agriculture [was] politically 
incorrect.”51 
The Supreme Court once considered the regulation of agriculture an 
inherently local power reserved to the states.52  In fact, many aspects of 
agriculture are inherently local in nature.53  The size, output, and 
 
consumer response.”). 
45. A small farm only has a small carbon footprint if its production methods are 
efficient, but small farms are generally efficient.  See Miguel A. Altieri, Agroecology, Small 
Farms, and Food Sovereignty, 61-03 MONTHLY REV. 102, 105 (2009) (“Although the 
conventional wisdom is that small family farms are backward and unproductive, research 
shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if total output is 
considered rather than yield from a single crop.”). 
46. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
47. See Desmond A. Jolly, Small Farms Re-emerge in National Agenda, 53(6) CAL. 
AGRIC. 2, 2 (1999), available at http://ucce.ucdavis.edu/files/repositoryfiles/ca5306p2-
67421.pdf (discussing the origin of the movement to restore to U.S. policy the Jeffersonian 
ideal of small farms). 
48. USDA NAT’L COMM’N ON SMALL FARMS, A TIME TO ACT 4-5 (1998), available at 
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/pdfs/time_to_act_1998.pdf. 
49. Id. at 5. 
50. USDA NAT’L COMM’N ON SMALL FARMS, A TIME TO CHOOSE (1981). 
51. Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture Without Farmers? Is Industrialization Restructuring 
American Food Production and Threatening the Future of Sustainable Agriculture?, 14 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 613, 625 (1994). 
52. “[T]he supervision of agriculture . . . [is] proper to be provided for by local 
legislation.” McCabe, supra note 20, at 151; see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 
(1936) (invalidating parts of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 because “[i]t is a 
statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers 
delegated to the federal government”); CHRISTINE A. VARNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: ENHANCING FEDERAL/STATE COOPERATION 6-7 (2009) 
(discussing the local nature of agricultural antitrust regulation), available at http://www.justic 
e.gov/atr/public/speeches/250635.pdf. 
53. See Kenneth E. Barker, The New Federalism: Time for States to Pull the Plow in 
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profitability of farms vary dramatically by state.54  The federal 
government has taken steps toward reforming its policy to support 
sustainable agriculture, but the impact has been very limited, and local 
governments are better equipped to enact policies that promote small 
farm development within their jurisdictional boundaries.55  Also, groups 
of small farmers engaged in lobbying efforts are better positioned to 
appeal to state and local governments because access to the federal 
government requires greater resources. 
D.   State-Level Interest in Sustainable Agriculture 
Local and state governments are well-suited to enact legislation that 
promotes sustainable agriculture by supporting small farmers, despite 
the post-Depression role that the federal government has assumed in 
regulating the agricultural industry.56 
States have an important interest within their police power that 
justifies promoting sustainable agriculture, even in states where the 
absence of very large farms means that industrialized agriculture does 
not cause direct harm.57  The police power interest includes human 
 
Soil Conservation, 30 S.D. L. REV. 546, 551 (1985) (discussing soil conservation as an 
inherently local activity that should be regulated by the states), available at 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-the-new-federalism-time-for-states-to-pull-
the-plow-in-soil-conservation-30-south-dakota-l-rev-546-573-1986/wppa_open/; Marci A. 
Hamilton, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., http://www.aals.org 
/profdev/constitutional/hamilton.html (last visited May 13, 2014) (“Real property is tied to a 
particular location, and its use immediately impacts a singular group, the local community.”). 
54. See, USDA NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AVERAGE FARM SIZE BY STATE 
(2006) available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Farms_and_Land_in_Farm 
s/fncht6.asp.  Note that every state in New England has an average farm size of less than 200 
acres, less than half the national average.  Id; see also Agricultural Productivity in the U.S., 
USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN THE U.S. available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-us.aspx#28250.  Six of 
the eight states with the lowest agricultural output in 2004 are New England states.  Id. at 
table 20. 
55. See McCabe, supra note 20, at 152 (“[U]nless reforms to the food system include 
local, state, and regional contributions and control, chances at curbing food-related diseases, 
improving poor nutrition, and reconnecting with the natural environment will diminish.”).  But 
see USDA, ASSISTING AMERICA’S SMALL FARMERS AND RANCHERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2003) (reporting on progress made by the USDA toward policies that support small 
agricultural operations), available at http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/pdfs/ 
meeting_challenge_time_to_act.pdf. 
56. “[T]he supervision of agriculture . . . [is] proper to be provided for by local 
legislation . . . . ” McCabe, supra note 20, at 151 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 
(Alexander Hamilton)).  “New Deal federalism and its progeny created distance between 
Americans and their food, contributing to the sense that Americans do not shape the food 
system, but allow it to shape us.”  McCabe, supra note 20, at 152. 
57. Every state has constitutional authority to legislate to promote the health, safety, 
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health as exemplified by the American obesity epidemic, environmental 
conservation related to the preservation of farmland, regional food 
security, and the traceability of contaminated food outbreaks.58 
1. Access to Fresh Food and the Obesity Epidemic 
 Lack of access to fresh food has contributed to problems related 
to poor health in this country.59  Among the scientific community, 
research suggests that “[t]here is a growing understanding that the 
availability of residential neighborhood resources that support . . . 
healthy food choices may influence obesity rates.”60 
 As the USDA notes, there is unquestionably “a correlation 
between food accessibility and BMI and obesity,” but other factors also 
contribute to health problems among Americans.61  Therefore, ideally, 
state and local governments will address obesity and diet-related health 
problems with comprehensive planning.  However, that planning should 
include improving access to fresh food as a critical component.62 
2. Farmland Preservation and the Environment 
 Farmland across the country has been disappearing rapidly, at a rate 
faster than an acre per minute.63  According to American Farmland 
 
and environment of its citizens.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
58. See generally McCabe, supra note 31, at 574-81 (discussing the inherent power of 
states to regulate food production). 
59. In one particular study on the correlation between health and access to grocery 
stores, “[t]he presence of supermarkets was associated with a lower prevalence of overweight, 
obesity, and hypertension.”  Kimberly Morland et al., Supermarkets, Other Food Stores, and 
Obesity: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 333, 
335 (2006), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/57754/ 
Supermarkets%20other%20food%20stores%20and%20obesity.pdf;jsessionid=A14333BFF2B
A47B51D7A1D868CED9C3E?sequence=1. 
60. Andrew Rundle et al., Neighborhood Food Environment and Walkability Predict 
Obesity in New York City, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 442, 442 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2661915/#b35-ehp-117-442. 
61. USDA, FOOD ACCESS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DIET AND HEALTH OUTCOMES, 
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND NUTRITIOUS FOOD: MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING FOOD 
DESERTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 51, 56 (2009), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/m 
edia/242606/ap036d_1_.pdf. 
62. Former Mayor of Boston, Thomas Menino, has voiced support for programs that 
improve access for children to fresh food: “[w]hen I go to work in the morning, I see kids 
standing at the bus stop eating chips and drinking a soda. . . . I hope this will help them change 
their eating habits and lead to a healthier lifestyle.”  Natasha Singer, Eat an Apple (Doctor’s 
Orders), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at B1 (covering a pilot program in Massachusetts where 
health professionals “prescribe” fruits and vegetables to children with diet-related health 
problems), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/business/13veggies.html?_r=0. 
63. Farmland Protection, AM. FARMLAND TR., http://www.farmland.org 
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Trust, this poses an environmental threat to the affected areas: 
Well-managed agricultural land supplies important non-market 
goods and services for our environment. Farm and ranch lands 
provide food and cover for wildlife, help control flooding, protect 
wetlands and watersheds and maintain air quality. They can absorb 
and filter wastewater and provide groundwater recharge. New energy 
crops even have the potential to replace fossil fuels.64 
This puts farmland preservation squarely within the police power of 
state and local governments. 
3. Regional Food Security 
“Food security,” according to the federal government, “is achieved 
when all people at all times have physical and economic access to 
sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy 
life.”65  This includes maintaining access to food even in the wake of 
crises like earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks.66  State and 
local governments have a great interest in ensuring access to food, 
especially considering the great distance food has to travel when local 
food systems are not available to provide resources in an emergency.67 
4. Outbreaks 
Common sense indicates that it is easier to trace outbreaks when the 
food is produced, distributed, and consumed locally.  A large producer 
may distribute vegetables from a contaminated crop across a wide 
geographic area, and when it becomes clear that the produce is 
contaminated, it will be difficult to trace the contamination back to the 
original source.68  It is also difficult to identify the final destination of 
 
/programs/protection/default.asp (last visited May 13, 2014) (“Every minute of every day, we 
have been losing more than an acre of agricultural land to development.”). 
64. Id; see also Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 237 (1998) (analyzing the issue of farmland preservation as a global concern). 
65. U.S. ACTION PLAN ON FOOD SECURITY, A MILLENNIUM FREE FROM HUNGER 2 
(2000). 
66. A. Bryan Endres & Jody M. Endres, Homeland Security Planning: What Victory 
Gardens and Fidel Castro Can Teach Us in Preparing for Food Crises in the United States, 
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 405 (2009) (explaining that food security requires “maintain[ing] 
sufficient food supplies in a time of crisis, in addition to an individual's basic right to daily, 
adequate nutrition”). 
67. See id. at 407 (“The federal government has not considered the role of regional and 
local food networks in its national homeland security planning.”). 
68. Note that the question of whether local foods are safer “has not been fully addressed 
by scientific literature.”  See Johnson & Endres, supra note 24, at 91-96, and sources cited 
therein. 
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every item that originated from the contaminated crop.69  When 
contaminated food is grown, sold, and eaten within one community, 
identifying the source of the contamination is a much simpler task.70  
The ability to trace the outbreak of foodborne illnesses is undoubtedly a 
legitimate health and safety concern for a state government.71 
State governments are well-equipped to promote the sustainable 
production of food.72  States are highly motivated to foster locally 
produced foods because it benefits the local economy in addition to 
bolstering regional food security and preserving farmland within the 
state.73  These benefits come at the risk of increased isolationism among 
the states, an economic tendency that courts have historically struggled 
to temper by way of the dormant Commerce Clause.74 
II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Courts recognize an implied negative aspect to the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution,75 and under this doctrine, states are 
prohibited from enacting legislation that interferes with interstate 
commerce.76  Because the federal government has taken a prominent role 
 
69. Id. 
70. The FDA has suggested there is no evidence of elevated risk arising from small-
scale egg regulation.  Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33030, 33036 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 16, 118).  For more commentary on this issue: 
Imagine if a large industrial food conglomerate sold Salmonella-tainted spinach 
to 100 local restaurants. Because the conglomerate dealt directly with the 
restaurants instead of a network of distributors and wholesalers, the source of the 
Salmonella outbreak would be immediately identifiable. This is essentially the 
“built-in” safety advantage of local food. 
Peter Anderson, Comment, Empowering Local and Sustainable Food: Does the Food Safety 
Modernization Act's Tester-Hagan Amendment Remove Enough Barriers?, 9 J.L. ECON. & 
POL'Y 145, 167 (2012). 
71. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28-29 (1905) (holding 
that a state may require vaccinations in exercise of its police power to protect public health by 
preventing the spread of disease). 
72. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1 and cases cited therein. 
73. For a discussion of state agricultural legislation benefitting the local economy, see 
Megan Galey & A. Bryan Endres, Locating the Boundaries of Sustainable Agriculture, 17 
NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y 3, 25-27 (2012). 
74. See infra Part II.  A primary justification for the dormant Commerce Clause offered 
by the Supreme Court is “to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization . . . among 
the States.”  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
76. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-91 (1824) (defining commerce as 
“commercial intercourse . . . regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse” 
and reserving that power exclusively to Congress, thereby preempting legislation by states that 
attempt concurrent regulation).  Notably, in his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall exempted state 
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in the regulation of the agriculture industry,77 state laws in this industry 
are especially vulnerable to challenge under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.78 
Critics say that courts apply the dormant Commerce Clause with 
unpredictable results.79  The unpredictable application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause has a chilling effect on potentially revolutionary state 
legislation.80  The Constitution has long been interpreted to impose 
restrictions on what states can do to promote local agriculture.81  But the 
standards used by courts in deciding cases in the context of some 
industries not related to the production of food are arguably more 
 
laws that “are, in their nature, health laws.”  Id. at 20. 
77. See supra Part I.B. 
78. See infra Part III. 
79. Justice Stevens criticized the application of the dormant Commerce Clause by 
noting that “our law in this area is something of a ‘quagmire’ and the ‘application of 
constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room for controversy and 
confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their 
indispensable power of taxation.’”  Quill Corp. v. N.D. By & Through Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 
298, 315-16 (1992) (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minn., 358 U.S. 450, 457 
(1959)).  A federal court in Vermont opined that “it is probably an understatement to say that 
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to limits on 
state taxation powers, is unpredictable.”  Barringer v. Griffes, 801 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Vt. 
1992) rev'd, 1 F.3d 1331 (2d Cir. 1993).  See also Lincoln L. Davies, Note, If You Give the 
Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate 
Waste Jurisprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 252-53 (1999) (“[I]t is impossible to 
draw from [the application of the dormant Commerce Clause] any coherent and consistent 
theoretical framework.  Indeed, modern constitutional law texts all seem to have their own 
take on the issue, analyzing the doctrine in their own, rather different ways.  The doctrine is 
also unpredictable.”). 
80. According to an astute analysis: 
“Results in Dormant Commerce Clause cases are notoriously unpredictable,” and 
this lack of predictability unnecessarily complicates national economic policy. 
The effect of the confusion is to chill state innovation, encourage lengthy 
litigation, and require Congress to intervene to remedy improvident judicial 
decisions. A clear policy that allows the states to regulate in the absence of 
congressional action would be preferable. 
Sherry Young, Is "Due Process" Unconstitutional? The NCAA Wins Round One in its Fight 
Against Regulation of its Enforcement Proceedings, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 841, 866 (1993) 
(quoting Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 395, 399 (1986)); see also Julian Cyril Zebot, Note, Awakening a Sleeping 
Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against 
Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2002) (“To the extent that the courts' 
indiscriminate approach in finding discriminatory purpose increases the potential for 
unwarranted and unpredictable judicial interference, it chills state and local creativity in 
crafting environmentally friendly waste management policies and undermines the dormant 
Commerce Clause as a doctrine.”); see generally Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The 
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
569 (1987) (criticizing the lack of rigor applied to dormant Commerce Clause challenges). 
81. See infra Part II.A. 
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relaxed from the doctrine as applied to agriculture.82 
A. Application of Dormant Commerce Clause to Agriculture 
1. Agriculture in the Supreme Court 
Since Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that the federal government has primary regulatory authority over the 
agriculture industry.83  A series of Supreme Court cases thwarted 
attempts by states to favor local agricultural production, processing, and 
distribution, relying on the dormant Commerce Clause.84  In particular, 
the Court’s decisions in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias and West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy come the nearest to addressing the issue of 
whether it is constitutional for a state to favor local foods.85 
At issue in Bacchus was a tax applied to all sales of alcohol in 
Hawai'i,86 with the exceptions of an alcoholic beverage made from a root 
native to Hawai'i, known as 'okolehao, in addition to pineapple wine and 
other non-grape fruit wine.87  The tax was primarily intended to benefit 
the burgeoning pineapple wine industry in Hawai'i.88  The Court flatly 
dismissed the state’s argument that the 'okolehao and pineapple wine 
 
82. See infra Part II.B. 
83. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress has authority under 
the Commerce Clause to limit the amount of wheat grown for personal use on private 
farmland). 
84. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (invalidating laws that favor in-
state wine producers); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (invalidating an 
act that applied a tax to all companies selling milk in Massachusetts, but distributed the 
benefits of the tax exclusively to in-state dairy farmers); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 
U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating a Hawaiian law that favored production of alcoholic beverages 
made from native plants); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) 
(invalidating a North Carolina rule that required disadvantaged, out-of-state apple producers 
to use a strict safety inspection standard); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 
349 (1951) (invalidating a Madison ordinance that required all milk sold in the city to have 
been pasteurized at a plant within a five mile radius of the city).  In each of these cases, the 
Court conducts a careful dormant Commerce Clause analysis before reaching a conclusion, 
and none of these opinions forecloses the possibility that states may regulate agriculture in 
such a way that does not discriminate impermissibly against interstate commerce. 
85. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. 
Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
86. In Hawai'i, the preferred spelling of the name of the state includes a form of 
punctuation known as an 'okina, which closely resembles an apostrophe.  In an effort to be 
sensitive to the people of Hawai'i, I have chosen to follow this convention.  See A Handbook 
of Citation Form for Law Clerks at the Appellate Courts of the State of Hawai'i, Hawai'i State 
Judiciary, at 23 (2008) (“The Hawai'i Judiciary has adopted a policy that encourages spelling 
and punctuating Hawaiian words correctly, i.e., using the 'okina . . . .”). 
87. Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 265. 
88. Id. 
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industries were separate and distinct from the industry of other alcoholic 
beverages, and that there was no direct competition among the 
industries.89  While the tax exemption did not discriminate against out-
of-state interests on its face, the Court found discriminatory intent and 
effect.90  By determining that the markets were the same and the tax 
discriminatory, the Court made it clear that states attempting to favor 
local agricultural production through discriminatory taxes, at least in the 
production of alcoholic beverages, would be susceptible to constitutional 
challenges.91  This threat looms over the sustainable agriculture 
movement today. 
The Court reached a similar holding in West Lynn Creamery, where 
a Massachusetts pricing order required the collection of an assessment 
on all milk sales.92  The proceeds were then distributed only to in-state 
dairy farmers.93  The assessment at issue did not facially discriminate 
against out-of-state interests because it applied equally to all dairy 
retailers.94  However, the fact that all of the proceeds were distributed to 
local dairy farmers95 resulted in a discriminatory impact.96  The Court 
reasoned that the assessment “not only assists local farmers, but burdens 
interstate commerce.  The pricing order thus violates the cardinal 
principle that a State may not ‘benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.’”97  By invalidating legislation based 
on the benefits provided to local agricultural enterprises, the decision in 
West Lynn casts a foreboding shadow over prospective legislation that 
might seek to advance the Local Food movement. 
2. Anti-Corporate Farming Initiatives 
Laws that limit the corporate ownership of farmland have been 
enacted in at least fourteen states.98  Some of the explanations that are 
offered in support of anti-corporate farming initiatives include 
 
89. Id. at 268-69. 
90. Id. at 271. 
91. Id. 
92. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 186. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 191-92. 
95. Id. at 191. 
96. Id. at 194. 
97. Id. at 199 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-
74 (1988)). 
98. Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, South Dakota Amendment E Ruled 
Unconstitutional—Is There a Future for Legislative Involvement in Shaping the Structure of 
Agriculture?, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 285, 285 n.5 (2004) (listing laws in each of fourteen 
states). 
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circumventing the limited liability of corporations, controlling the 
economic structure of food production and distribution, the lack of 
investment in local interests by out-of-state corporations, opening land 
for use by new farmers, and the negative socioeconomic impact of 
agribusiness on rural communities.99 
A landmark 2003 case struck down an amendment to the South 
Dakota State Constitution outlawing corporate ownership of in-state 
farmland.100  The Eighth Circuit decision in South Dakota Farm Bureau, 
Inc. v. Hazeltine “is viewed as critical to the future viability of anti-
corporate farming restrictions in other states and, more generally, to the 
ability of state legislatures to shape the structure of agriculture within 
their borders.”101  The opinion signaled the death of a constitutional 
amendment that was supported by a majority of voters in South Dakota 
in 1998.102 
The decision rested on the finding of a discriminatory purpose in 
the constitutional amendment.103  This impermissible purpose was 
determined based on the court’s analysis of the drafting process.104  The 
court also criticized the lack of supporting evidence for the claim that the 
amendment would be beneficial to the environment.105  The 
discriminatory intent made the amendment virtually per se invalid in the 
eyes of the court.106  Since less discriminatory methods of achieving the 
same goals were plausible, such as rigorous enforcement of enhanced 
environmental regulations,107 the amendment was stricken.108 
A few years later, the Eighth Circuit echoed the dormant 
 
99. Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-Farming Measures in a Post-Jones World, 14 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 99-102 (2009). 
100. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’g 
202 F.Supp. 2d 1020 (D. S.D. 2002). 
101. McEowen & Harl, supra note 98, at 285 (citation omitted). 
102. McEowen & Harl, supra note 98, at 288 (citation omitted). 
103. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc., 340 F.3d at 594. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 595 (“[T]he less information concerning the potential impact of [the 
amendment] that the drafters had, the less likely that [it] would actually be an effective 
remedy for the problems it was purportedly designed to address.  A low probability of 
effectiveness can be indirect evidence of discriminatory purpose.”).  The court also 
acknowledged that the intent of the voters who supported the amendment was unknowable, 
but concluded that this was not an important fact.  Id. at 596 (“We . . . have evidence of the 
intent of individuals who drafted the amendment that went before the voters.  It is clear that 
those individuals had a discriminatory purpose.”). 
106. Id. at 597. 
107. Id. (“[T]he State could introduce stricter environmental regulations or could more 
aggressively enforce its current environmental laws.”). 
108. Id. at 598. 
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Commerce Clause analysis in Hazeltine in response to a challenge to a 
1985 anti-corporate farming amendment to the Nebraska State 
Constitution.109  Once again, the court easily identified the 
discriminatory intent of the drafters of the amendment.110  The court 
determined that, just as in South Dakota, the legislators in Nebraska had 
less discriminatory alternatives for reaching the environmental goals 
supported by the amendment, like improved “land use and 
environmental regulations.”111  The amendment was held 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.112 
While no other courts have addressed anti-corporate farming 
initiatives, the Eighth Circuit holdings (in addition to the other dormant 
Commerce Clause cases discussed above) provide a basis for 
determining whether legislation that promotes sustainable farming113 
would survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.  They may also 
potentially impact whether similar legislation may be enacted in other 
states.114  The following section of this Note will argue that careful 
framing of prospective legislative initiatives will result in legislation that 
can survive dormant Commerce Clause challenges, but only where steps 
are taken to position the initiatives in a nondiscriminatory manner that 
does not interfere with interstate commerce.  Generally, courts approach 
evaluation under the dormant Commerce Clause based on the specific 
nature of the challenged legislation,115 which provides some context for 
exploring how local governments may encourage sustainable agriculture 
 
109. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 2006). 
110. In fact, the intent was clearer in Nebraska than in Iowa.  Jones, 470 F.3d at 1270 
(“[T]elevision advertisements that supporters of Initiative 300 produced before its adoption 
concluded by stating: ‘Let's send a message to those rich out-of-state corporations.  Our land's 
not for sale, and neither is our vote. Vote for Initiative 300.’  It is clear beyond cavil that these 
ads bristle with an animus against out-of-state corporations.”). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1271 (“We . . . have no other option than to . . . hold that the entire 
amendment . . . is unconstitutional.”). 
113. Note that policies that support the consumption of sustainably produced food are 
distinct from the goals of anti-corporate farming laws, which intend to “restrict corporations 
from owning agricultural land.”  Schutz, supra note 99, at 98. 
114. See Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 18 
URB. LAW. 567, 587 (1986) (“Because the outcomes of the cases are so unpredictable, the 
doctrine may well have a chilling effect on legitimate state regulation.”), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1307&context=facpubs; see 
also McEowen & Harl, supra note 98, at 302 (“The opinion [in Hazeltine] could also have a 
chilling effect on further legislation impacting the future structure of agriculture.”). 
115. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in Support of 
Petitioners at 5, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 (2012) (No. 10-1322) (“The Court's 
precedent eschews rigid, formalistic rules, and instead requires a textured and fact-specific 
inquiry into the purpose and effect of the state legislation.”). 
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while withstanding constitutional scrutiny. 
3. Inconsistent Lower Court Decisions 
The decision in Granholm v. Heald stated unequivocally that 
Amendment XXI, which repealed Prohibition116 while leaving states 
wide latitude in regulating alcoholic beverages,117 does not guarantee 
local governments the right to enact discriminatory laws that favor the 
local alcoholic beverage industry.118  Since Granholm, several attempts 
have been made to circumvent dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny 
through legislation that does not facially discriminate against out-of-state 
interests.119 
 Two circuit court opinions have examined whether a statute can 
be in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause by way of facial 
discrimination against larger producers of wine in favor of smaller 
producers; the First Circuit struck down a Massachusetts statute120 and 
the Ninth Circuit upheld an Arizona statute.121  The statutes were very 
similar, having both been passed in the wake of Granholm v. Heald, and 
both trying to accomplish the same kind of regulation that Granholm v. 
Heald found unconstitutional.122  Both statutes allowed some 
winemakers to sell directly to consumers and retailers, thus bypassing 
the requirement to sell only to wholesalers.123  That advantage was only 
available to small producers, forcing large producers to continue to sell 
only to wholesalers.124  In Massachusetts, there were no in-state 
producers of wine that exceeded the production limit, known as the 
gallonage cap.125  In Arizona, there was exactly one producer in the state 
that met the threshold.126  Both statutes were challenged based on the 
 
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
117. Id. at § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation 
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”). 
118. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 461 (2005). 
119. Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncorking Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination 
Principle to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1888 (2011). 
120. See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
121. See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010). 
122. Quigley, supra note 119, at 1888 (“Some states, for example, revised their direct 
shipping laws so that they discriminated in incidental effect . . . . In the resulting litigation, 
federal courts have been unable to reach a consistent interpretation of the Granholm 
mandate.”) (citations omitted). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 4. 
126. Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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effects they would have on the wine market: consumers would purchase 
more wine from small wineries, and since small wineries are, as a 
practical matter, more likely to be successful locally, the statutes altered 
the balance between in-state and out-of-state wine purchasing, thus 
impermissibly interfering with interstate commerce.127 
 There is an explanation in Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver for 
why the two courts reached different conclusions about the 
constitutionality of the respective statutes: “[T]he plaintiffs in that case, 
unlike the plaintiffs here, had evidence to prove their contentions.”128  
The First Circuit opinion did not discuss the evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs showing the discriminatory effects of the statute.  The court did 
refer to the Arizona district court case upheld in Black Star Farms LLC 
v. Oliver, distinguishing it only by saying: “[W]e [do not] find the 
reasoning . . . to be persuasive.”129 
 The two circuit court cases involve actions of state legislators that 
seem to have obvious protectionist purposes.  The statutes in place at the 
time of Granholm v. Heald in both states were no longer valid, and so 
both states enacted these statutes presumably with the intent to serve the 
same local protectionist needs.  Generally, when the motivations of 
legislation are challenged in court, “[i]nterests are found to be 
illegitimate only when the state, in the Court’s words, ‘artlessly 
discloses’ the aim of favoring its own people economically.”130  If the 
different outcomes in these two circuit court cases are due to “artless 
disclosure” or a test of “whether the legislature has a stupid staff,”131 
then the credibility of the dormant Commerce Clause as a rigorous 
doctrine is further undermined.132  Alternatively, it may be more 
appropriate to attribute the disparate outcomes to different 
understandings of the doctrines in the two circuits. 
 
127. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 10; Black Star Farms LLC, 600 F.3d at 1231. 
128. Black Star Farms LLC, 600 F.3d at 1233.  While helpful, this analysis raises more 
questions than answers.  For example, how prudent is a constitutional doctrine that would 
reach opposite conclusions regarding state laws in similar cases based solely on how the 
attorneys present the cases? 
129. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 13 n.14. 
130. Smith, supra note 13, at 1235 (citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 
349, 354 (1951)).  Note that the content of the statute and the true intentions of legislators are 
only part of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis; because the record of a case may 
incidentally bear on the outcome, it may result in disparate outcomes. 
131. See Gregory S. Weber, Forging A More Coherent Groundwater Policy in 
California: State and Federal Constitutional Law Challenges to Local Groundwater Export 
Restrictions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 479 (1994) (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 n.12 (1992)) (drawing attention to the unreliability of a 
test based on statements by legislatures). 
132. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
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The First Circuit’s invalidation of the Massachusetts statute in 
Family Winemakers was foreshadowed by an earlier case involving 
discrimination that effectively favored small businesses in Puerto 
Rico.133  In Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, the First Circuit decided whether a 
grandfather clause that allowed pharmacies in operation in Puerto Rico 
in 1979 to open new stores without first seeking a specific permit.134  
This clause was held unconstitutional by the First Circuit because the 
vast majority of pharmacies existing in Puerto Rico at the time (92%) 
were locally owned and operated.135  When considered with Family 
Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, this case demonstrates a level of 
consistency in the reasoning of the First Circuit. 
 Conversely, another interesting case out of Puerto Rico, Coors 
Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, demonstrates the inconsistent 
application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.136  The district court 
opinion was overturned on grounds unrelated to the dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis because a federal comity decision made it procedurally 
invalid for the statute to be challenged in federal court without 
exhausting state court remedies.137  The legislative act at issue in this 
case was a tax that applied only to large producers of beer.138  The 
district court dismissed the claim of discriminatory intent brought by the 
challenger, reasoning: “What motivates one legislator to make a speech 
about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact 
it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”139  
The district court further reasoned that the statute did not discriminate in 
effect because “[b]rewers from other states may also qualify as small 
brewers and, indeed, have, during the relevant period.”140  The First 
Circuit never had the opportunity to apply the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine in Coors, but the decisions in Family Winemakers of 
California and Walgreens imply that this tax would have been 
invalidated.141  Outside the First Circuit, however, some industries have 
typically received much more relaxed treatment under the dormant 
 
133. Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005). 
134. Id. at 53. 
135. Id. at 52-53. 
136. 787 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.P.R. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 678 F.3d 15 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
137. Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 678 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2012). 
138. Coors Brewing Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d at 157, aff’d in part, vacated in part, 678 F.3d 
15 (1st Cir. 2012). 
139. Id. at 171 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)). 
140. Id. at 172. 
141. Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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Commerce Clause.142 
B. Lenient Application of Dormant Commerce Clause to Other 
Industries 
1. Dissimilar Business Entities 
Some other industries outside the realm of agriculture have 
historically been treated more leniently under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  The distribution of oil falls into this category.  A separate 
outcome of Supreme Court analysis indicates that when a state act 
discriminates against one type of business in favor of a differently 
situated business, it is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, despite the fact that the challenged legislation in each case 
favors a type of business with local ties.143  For example, the statute at 
issue in Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland was enacted in 
response to problems that arose from the U.S. petroleum shortage crisis 
of 1973.144  During the crisis, gasoline was not fairly distributed among 
retailers in Maryland because producers favored company-owned retail 
stations to the detriment of independent retail stations.145  In response, 
Maryland enacted a law forbidding gasoline producers and refiners from 
operating stations within the state.146  The law discriminated against oil 
producers and refiners, all of which were outside the state of Maryland, 
and the benefits of the statute fell to independent station operators.147  
The Court points out that “there are several major interstate marketers of 
petroleum that own and operate their own retail gasoline stations” in 
Maryland.148  The Court also refers to the fact that since all gasoline sold 
in Maryland originated outside the state, the flow of gasoline into the 
state is not affected by the statute.149 
Similar reasoning was echoed in 1989 when the Court decided 
 
142. See infra Part II.B. 
143. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (upholding an Ohio tax 
exemption only for natural gas sales by companies that are subject to state regulations); 
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep’t of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66 (1989) 
(upholding legislation that discriminates against companies that both filed taxes in New Jersey 
and paid a federal windfall tax for oil profits); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 
(1978) (upholding a Maryland law that prohibits producers and refiners of oil and gasoline 
from selling gasoline directly to consumers). 
144. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 121. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 119. 
147. Id. at 125. 
148. Id. at 125-26. 
149. Id. at 125. 
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Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, New Jersey 
Department of Treasury.150  This case assessed the validity of a New 
Jersey tax law that forced oil producers to pay taxes on income related to 
federal windfall profits, even though no in-state corporations or 
individuals were subject to the tax.151  The tax was upheld by the Court 
in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun,152 the sole signer to a dissent 
in Exxon eleven years prior.153 
The line of cases where the Court invalidated agricultural 
legislation can be distinguished from the oil distribution line of cases, 
where each act was upheld, based on the way the Court characterized the 
industry impacted by state regulation.154  In each case in the oil 
distribution line, the Court determined that in-state and out-of-state 
entities that were similarly situated were treated even-handedly, 
separately viewing the entities burdened by the legislation as dissimilar 
and not in direct competition with the favored entities.155  In the 
agricultural line, however, the Court determined that burdened entities 
were in the same competitive industry as the favored entities.156  To put 
the contrast into sharp relief: according to Exxon, oil refiners and 
independent oil distributors were dissimilar and not in direct 
competition;157 but in Bacchus, pineapple wine producers were similarly 
situated to all other producers of alcoholic beverages and were 
competing for the same market.158 
1. Cable and Satellite 
In recent years, state tax legislation that benefits cable companies at 
 
150. 490 U.S. 66 (1989). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 134-35. 
154. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997) (“[T]here is a threshold 
question whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes.”). 
155. Id. 
156. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (“Surely one way that 
the tax exemption might [foster local industries by encouraging increased consumption] is that 
drinkers of other alcoholic beverages might give up or consume less of their customary drinks 
in favor of the exempted products because of the price differential that the exemption will 
permit.”). 
157. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 (“The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on 
some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against 
interstate commerce.”); see also Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 310 (“[T]he enterprises 
should not be considered ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination 
under the Commerce Clause.”). 
158. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 269 (“[W]e are unwilling to conclude that no competition 
exists between the exempted and the nonexempted liquors.”). 
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the expense of satellite subscribers has been challenged in several cases 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.159  Cable companies invest in 
local labor and infrastructure in any state where they operate, whereas 
satellite companies do not depend on local infrastructure and hire 
relatively few local employees for their operations.160  States receive an 
obvious benefit from incentivizing investment in local infrastructure.  
The local benefits are primarily economic, distinguishing the issue from 
agriculture, where the benefits of local production are much more 
widespread.161 
Satellite companies argue that the unequal taxation schemes are 
discriminatory and should therefore be stricken under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.162  The states that defend these statutes argue that 
there is no discrimination because cable and satellite companies are not 
similarly situated, and therefore differential treatment is not 
discriminatory.163  State courts in Ohio and North Carolina upheld the 
contentious tax schemes;164 however, a strongly worded dissent in the 
case out of Ohio suggests that the issue may not be resolved to the 
satisfaction of all courts and may come up again in the future.165 
The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari on whether states 
may institute tax legislation that favors cable television providers.166  
The challenger’s petition insisted that the Court must address the 
doctrinal uncertainty that exists in contemporary Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, emphasizing the dissonant outcomes of Family 
Winemakers of California in the First Circuit and Black Star Farms LLC 
 
159. Douglas R. Cole & Charles M. Steines, State Supreme Court Rejects Commerce 
Clause Challenge to Sales Tax Statute; a Dissent Strongly Differs, 21-7 J. MULTISTATE 
TAX’N & INCENTIVES 25, 25 (2011). 
160. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2007). 
161. See supra note 27 and sources cited therein. 
162. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ohio 2010), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 51 (2012). 
163. Id. at 1193-94 (“[D]ifferential tax treatment of ‘two categories of companies 
result[ing] solely from differences between the nature of their businesses, [and] not from the 
location of their activities,’ does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (quoting 
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep’t. of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 78 
(1989)). 
164. Id. at 1197; DIRECTV, Inc. v. State, 632 S.E.2d 543, 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
165. See DIRECTV, Inc., 941 N.E.2d at 1202 (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (“In sum, the 
sales tax treats competing industries differently, effectively (and perhaps intentionally) 
favoring the industry with extensive local ties over the one with comparatively few.  Such a 
law violates the Commerce Clause.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”). 
166. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 (2012). 
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in the Ninth Circuit.167  It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would 
view cable and satellite companies as similarly situated entities, and it is 
also unclear whether small and large farms would be examined under the 
same lens.  This uncertainty leaves room for crafting legislation that may 
survive dormant Commerce Clause review, even where a court may 
otherwise find it discriminatory. 
III. POTENTIAL FOR STATES TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE 
AGRICULTURE168 
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, as discussed in the 
preceding section, may be employed to challenge any state action that 
benefits producers of local foods.169  State actions may survive 
constitutional challenge if care is taken to craft legislation that does not 
offend contemporary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Several 
options that states may take to survive review are considered below. 
A. Double Food Stamps at Farmers’ Markets 
Wholesome Wave began its Double Value Coupon Program in 
2008.170  The nonprofit organization initiated the program in 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and California with the goal of providing 
incentives for low-income families to purchase fresh food directly from 
producers at farmers’ markets.171  The program works by securing 
donations that double the value of federal benefits such as the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental 
Special Nutrition for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).172  The 
 
167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27-28, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 
(2012) (No. 10-1322), 2012 WL 1594681, at *27-28. (“[T]here is no way to reconcile these 
two lines of cases.  They represent fundamentally different — indeed opposite — views of the 
Commerce Clause, where the outcome depends not on the facts of the case, but on the state 
that passes the statute.”).  See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in 
Support of Petitioners at 5, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 (2012) (No. 10-1322), 
2012 WL 2135015, at *5 (“The amici have no direct stake in this litigation, but do have an 
interest in seeing Commerce Clause jurisprudence develop in a sound manner.  Failure to 
correct the decision below could threaten that development.  The amici agree with the 
petitioners’ description of the splits to which the decision below contributes.”). 
168. This Note does not attempt to explore all potential methods states may employ to 
promote sustainable agriculture.  A variety of alternatives exist, from innocuous advertising 
programs that encourage consumers to shop at farmers’ markets to an outright ban on the sale 
of goods produced in other states. 
169. See supra Part II.A. 
170. Double Value Coupon Program (DVCP), WHOLESOME WAVE, http://wholesomew 
ave.org/dvcp/ (last visited May 13, 2014). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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success of this program has allowed it to expand, and now there are 
beneficiaries in at least twenty-four states who are able to purchase fresh 
produce directly from farmers, improving the health of low-income 
families and providing support to farmers who make their food available 
to these families.173  The reliance on donor funding, however, places 
limits on how broadly the program can be implemented.174 
States have a powerful interest in lending financial support to 
programs like the Double Value Coupon Program, which encourages 
better nutrition among low-income residents.175  Because of the strong 
correlation between the obesity epidemic and socioeconomic status,176 
entitlement benefits may be employed to improve the health of state 
citizens.  There is an added incentive for farmers’ markets to be made 
accessible to low-income families, which may be a step toward solving 
the problem of food deserts.177  Furthermore, the Double Value Coupon 
Program promotes other important state interests, like the preservation of 
farmland and the economic viability of local food production, 178 by 
providing financial benefits to local farmers who sell their goods at 
farmers’ markets.179 
If a state were to fund a similar program, a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge may have traction because the benefits would fall to 
local interests at the expense of out-of-state food producers.  For 
example, a small farm in Massachusetts can benefit from increased sales 
at a local farmers’ market due to the availability of entitlements from the 
state, while a large vegetable producer in California would not have 
equal access to those benefits.  In fact, interstate commerce will be 
burdened by a market shift toward local purchases.180 
 
173. Id. 
174. Deborah Geering, SNAP Challenge: Live on ‘Food Stamps’ for a Week, 
ATLANTAMAGAZINE.COM (Oct. 23, 2013) (“The nonprofit organization uses private 
donations to double the value of SNAP benefits.”), available at http://www.atlantamagazine 
.com/covereddish/2013/10/23/snap-challenge-live-on-food-stamps-for-a-week/print. 
175. See Double Value Coupon Program, supra note 170. 
176. See supra Part I.D.1. 
177. See Vicki A. McCracken et al., Do Farmers’ Markets Ameliorate Food Deserts?, 
29 FOCUS 21, 24 (2012) (“There is evidence that farmers’ markets in both rural and urban 
areas help to alleviate food deserts; however, rural markets are more likely to be disconnected 
from Farmers’ Market Nutrition Programs [in Washington State].”), available at 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc291f.pdf.  “Several studies . . . have used 
the term ‘food deserts’ to describe geographic areas where nutritious and affordable food is 
difficult to obtain.”  Id. 
178. See supra Part I.D.2. 
179. See Double Value Coupon Program, supra note 170. 
180. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (explaining that 
providing a benefit to a select category of producers is equivalent to encouraging consumers 
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There is no precedent for dormant Commerce Clause challenges to 
succeed against entitlement benefits meant to provide support for low-
income families.  On this basis alone, it is likely that a program that 
doubles food stamp benefits will not be challenged under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  States are generally not restricted by the 
Constitution in how public assistance in the form of social welfare may 
be distributed to state citizens.181 
It is important that, in implementing a program such as this, states 
avoid facial discrimination against out-of-state interests.  As asserted by 
the Fifth Circuit in 1980, out-of-state producers must be permitted to sell 
at in-state farmers’ markets and have access to the state-sponsored 
benefits, because otherwise there would be discrimination against out-
of-state interests.182  If out-of-state farmers are permitted to sell produce 
at farmers’ markets in the state, then doubling the value of food stamps 
at these markets with state funds should not be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
B. Direct Subsidies for Local Farmers 
States may choose to provide direct subsidies to local farmers as a 
way to promote sustainable practices and to encourage the preservation 
of farmland.  This is a method by which states may offset the harmful 
effects of federal subsidies.183  Some states already make grants 
available for agricultural businesses.184  For example, Vermont recently 
passed legislation to implement the Working Lands Enterprise 
 
to “consume less of” products outside that category). 
181. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 603-04 
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have always recognized the legitimacy of limiting 
state-provided welfare benefits to bona fide residents.”). 
182. See Smith v. Dep’t. of Agric. of Ga., 630 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that it is a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause to restrict participation in a state-
sponsored farmers’ market to in-state producers). 
183. According to William S. Eubanks II, federal subsidies have been a cause of great 
harm to food production in the United States: 
The decisions made by those in power have resulted in the gradual narrowing of 
commodity subsidies to a select handful of crops, distortion of the agricultural 
market by artificially supporting only these select crops, and the slow, painful 
death of small farming in the United States. This “death” has transformed rural 
America into a wasteland of large commercialized farms and abandoned fields 
that once served as symbols of hope to the families that depended on their 
plentiful yields. 
William S. Eubanks II, The Sustainable Farm Bill: A Proposal for Permanent Environmental 
Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10493, 10495 (2009). 
184. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (2012). 
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Initiative,185 which subsidizes “agricultural… and forest products based 
businesses.”186  Similarly, Massachusetts offers small grants to new farm 
businesses.187  The program was implemented “to assist farmers whose 
goal is to raise agricultural products and who aspire to develop their 
farms into commercially viable operations.”188 
Direct subsidies are generally not subject to invalidation under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.189  However, the fact remains that subsidies 
are discriminatory by nature because they provide a benefit to local 
economic interests while excluding similarly situated out-of-state 
competitors.190 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stopped short of declaring an 
outright exception to the dormant Commerce Clause for direct business 
subsidies.191  In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, the Court 
invalidated a direct subsidy that was offered to Massachusetts dairy 
producers, but in that case, the funding for the subsidies came 
“principally from taxes on the sale of milk produced in other States.”192  
In this way, the Court distinguished the subsidy at issue from “[a] pure 
subsidy funded out of general revenue[, which] ordinarily imposes no 
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business.”193  
The implication here is that subsidies are likely constitutional when they 
are funded out of the state’s general treasury; the same is not true in 
cases where the source of the funding “burdens interstate commerce.”194  
Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the funds for subsidies to 
local farmers come from the general treasury of the state and not a tax 
specifically linked to the benefit.195  States, and courts if the subsidies 
 
185. Id. 
186. Working Lands Enterprise Initiative: Purpose and Legislation, VERMONT.GOV, 
http://workinglands.vermont.gov/wlei/working_lands_summary (last visited May 13, 2014). 
187. Matching Enterprise Grants for Agriculture Program, MASS.GOV, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/agr/about/divisions/mega.html (last visited May 13, 2014). 
188. Id. 
189. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (“Direct 
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce 
Clause].”). 
190. But see W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (explaining 
that a “pure subsidy” provides a local economic benefit but does not impermissibly burden 
interstate commerce). 
191. “We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we 
need not do so now.”  Id. at 199 n.15 (1994). 
192. Id. at 199. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. For an in-depth discussion of business subsidies and their treatment under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, post-West Lynn Creamery, see Dan T. Coenen, Business 
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are challenged, should look favorably to this option for promoting local 
agriculture. 
C. Taxes on Goods Produced on Large Farms 
Taxes in any form are generally analyzed carefully by courts when 
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause.196  Some 
discriminatory taxes are upheld,197 but often they are not.198  In light of 
the fact that direct subsidization of local businesses is generally 
permissible,199 disfavoring taxes that discriminate against out-of-state 
interests may appear contradictory.  Both selective subsidies and 
discriminatory taxes have the effect of giving a financial advantage to 
some participants in the marketplace, which inarguably puts other 
participants at a disadvantage.  Treating subsidies differently from taxes 
appears to be a focus on form over substance.200  There is a lack of 
clarity on this issue, which suggests that further guidance may be 
required from the Court in the future before the outcome of dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges will be reliably predictable.  However, 
there is ample jurisprudence for examining the current rules regarding 
differential taxation by state governments.201 
The primary fundamental question asked by courts is whether the 
tax is discriminatory against out-of-state interests.202  If a tax is explicitly 
levied only against agricultural goods produced out-of-state, then it will 
be virtually per se invalid.203  It is almost impossible for any tax to 
survive this standard of review.204  Therefore, if a state wishes for a tax 
 
Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998). 
196. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199 (deciding that the presence of a tax 
triggers an analysis of whether a subsidy violates the dormant Commerce Clause). 
197. See, e.g., supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
198. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 
U.S. 263, 265 (1984). 
199. See supra Part III.B. 
200. Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 196, 197-98 (2007), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index. 
php?id=7.  Professor Zelinsky questions: “What, I respectfully ask, is the point of all of this? 
Why are state subsidies constitutionally acceptable in the form of direct cash grants, but 
become discriminatory protectionism when undertaken by means of economically equivalent 
tax breaks?”  Id. at 198-99. 
201. See id. 
202. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
203. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“If a 
restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”). 
204. See Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate 
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 574 
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encouraging sustainable agriculture to pass constitutional muster, the tax 
must be applied even-handedly to in-state and out-of-state interests. 
A state tax may be crafted to exclude goods that meet specific 
production standards of sustainability.  For example, if produce is grown 
without the use of synthetic chemical fertilizers, on a farm meeting very 
high environmental standards, and transported using a minimal amount 
of fossil fuels, then the producer may be exempt from the tax.  A tax that 
is structured in this way might not be facially discriminatory against out-
of-state interests, but implementation would be highly impractical.  A 
state would have to devote tremendous resources to evaluating the 
claims of producers in order to ensure that those exempted meet the 
stringent criteria. 
In order to simplify the hypothetical tax structure, food produced on 
small farms may be exempted.  This would serve the purpose of 
benefitting food that is produced more sustainably, because small farms 
tend to employ more sustainable practices than large farms.205  It is 
unclear how courts will respond to taxes that treat food produced on 
small farms differently than food produced on large farms.  Two 
important factors to consider in predicting the constitutionality of such a 
tax are the definition of “small” and whether the court will find that 
small and large farms are differently situated business types. 
The threshold for being taxed as a small farm could be determined 
based on the income of the farm.  The USDA defines small farms as 
those earning less than $250,000 per year.206  Most farms in the U.S. are 
small farms under this definition.207  In Massachusetts, for example, only 
6.5% of farms would be taxed as large farms.208  However, since there is 
a greater percentage of large farms outside the state than inside, the 
burden of a discriminatory tax would fall disproportionately on out-of-
 
(1997) (“As the standard's name suggests, a discriminatory regulation will almost never 
survive review under the virtual per se invalid standard of scrutiny.”). 
205. For a discussion of how small farm practices tend to be more sustainable, see 
D’Souza & Ikerd, supra note 43.  “[T]he characteristics of small farms seem to most closely 
resemble those of sustainable systems.”  Id. at 82.  See also supra Part I.C. 
206. 7 C.F.R. § 4284.902 (2013). 
207. According to the 2007 Agriculture Census, the USDA reported that 91% of all 
U.S. farms were small farms.  2007 Census of Agriculture: Small Farms, U. S. DEPT. OF 
AGRIC., at 1, http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Fact_Shee 
ts/Farm_Numbers/small_farm.pdf.  Notably, 91% of farms only produced about 15% of the 
total farm income in the U.S. in 2007.  Id. 
208. USDA NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., Tbl. 2. Market Value of Agricultural 
Products Sold Including Landlord’s Share and Direct Sales: 2007 and 2002, 2007 CENSUS 
VOLUME 1, CHAPTER 1: STATE LEVEL DATA (MASSACHUSETTS), http://www.agcensus.usda.g 
ov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_State_Level/Massachusetts/st25_1_
002_002.pdf (last visited May 14, 2014). 
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state interests.  Furthermore, in-state sales by small farms are likely to be 
primarily made by in-state small farms; therefore the benefits of being 
exempt from the tax are disproportionately going to fall to in-state 
interests. 
For legislation to be found discriminatory under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the type of business being benefitted must be 
similarly situated to the type of business being burdened.209  This 
analysis considers whether the businesses are in competition with each 
other and whether they receive a share of the market that shifts after the 
legislation is enacted.210  It is likely that a court would consider small 
farms to be similarly situated in comparison to large farms because small 
and large farms compete for shares of the same food production market 
and, moreover, different types of agricultural production have been held 
to be similarly situated in the past.211 
It is possible, however, that courts would reach a different outcome.  
The typical point of sale for small farms is more frequently through 
direct sale to consumers, while large farms are more likely to use an 
intermediate channel, such as sales at a supermarket.212  This distinction 
may not appear material on the surface; everybody needs to eat, so small 
and large producers are certainly in competition for the same market.  
But cable and satellite television providers are competing for increased 
market share among television audiences, just like small and large food 
producers are competing for increased market share among 
consumers.213  In fact, from the point of view of the consumer, the 
 
209. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1201 (Ohio 2010) (“The problem 
of comparing mismatched sets of ‘interstate players’ is answered by the requirement that the 
favored and disfavored parties be similarly situated.”). 
210. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997) (considering “actual or 
prospective competition between the supposedly favored and disfavored entities” relevant to 
whether a provision discriminates against interstate commerce). 
211. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (“[A]s long as there is 
some competition between the locally produced exempt products and non-exempt products 
from outside the State, there is a discriminatory effect.”). 
212. See Renée Johnson, Tadlock Cowan & Randy Alison Aussenberg, The Role of 
Local Food Systems in U.S. Farm Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 6 (Jan. 20, 
2012), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC 
5097249. 
213. Generally, companies seek an increase in market share.  But see What is Market 
Share?, WISE GEEK, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-market-share.htm (last visited May 14, 
2014) (“Despite this, having a larger market share isn't always a good thing.  It might not be 
profitable if the increase is associated with expensive advertising or a big price decrease.  A 
company may not be able to meet the demand of an increased percentage of the market 
without huge investments in new equipment and employees.  Too much of an increase also 
may not be beneficial if it violates a country's anti-trust laws.  Additionally, if a company 
values its share of the market above sustainable practices, it can cause big problems in the 
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difference between cable and satellite television is similar to the 
difference between points of sale for large and small food producers.  
The argument that cable and satellite television providers are differently 
situated business types has prevailed in courts,214 so it is also possible 
that the argument would be successful regarding a tax that treats large 
and small food producers differently. 
It is difficult to assess a particular size above which a farm becomes 
a differently situated business type, either based on annual income or 
number of acres, for the purposes of establishing differential tax 
treatment.215  Simply using the size threshold determined by the USDA 
is an option.216  However, there is no evidence that all farms with 
income greater than $250,000 each year are always less sustainable than 
farms with income below that threshold.  The opinion of one expert is 
that “the farmer must ultimately decide how big a farm should be” to 
remain sustainable.217  A large farm may employ practices that make it 
relatively sustainable, while a small farm may employ practices that are 
especially harmful to the environment.  An arbitrary size threshold may 
be a practical way to differentiate between sustainable and non-
sustainable farms as different categories of businesses, but it is important 
to recognize that it will not be a precise division.  A court may determine 
that the use of an arbitrary threshold to distinguish two types of 
businesses fails; a farm that earns $251,000 per year is not necessarily a 
different type of business from a farm that earns $249,000 per year. 
A tax that applies to food produced on large farms, which would 
exempt food produced on small farms, will face constitutional obstacles 
under dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.218  Double food stamps at 
farmers’ markets and direct subsidies to sustainable farming operations 
are more likely to survive constitutional challenges.219 
D. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny 
Because scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause can be, at 
times, unpredictable, it is important that legislators take care to avoid 
pitfalls that might send signals of economic protectionism to a court.  It 
 
long run.”). 
214. See supra Part II.B.2. 
215. See John Ikerd, How Big Should a Small Farm Be?, NAT’L SMALL FARM TODAY 
CONF. AND TRADE SHOW (2002), available at http://web.missouri.edu/ikerdj/papers/SmFmHo 
wBig.html#_ftn1. 
216. See 7 C.F.R. § 4284.902 (2013). 
217. Ikerd, supra note 215. 
218. See supra, Part III.C. 
219. See supra, Part III.A-B. 
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is important, for example, that legislators do not put themselves on the 
record as motivated to support legislation because of the local economic 
benefits that come from shifting the market share to local producers.220  
Avoiding statements suggesting that the intent of legislation is economic 
protectionism can make it more difficult for a challenger to prove 
discriminatory purpose.221 
Furthermore, when supporting legislation, it is important to 
recognize that extraterritorial benefits, meaning benefits that reach 
outside of the jurisdiction enacting the legislation, are not within the 
authority of local legislators.222  For example, sustainable practices in 
Massachusetts may cause less environmental harm than industrial 
practices in a faraway state; however, Massachusetts does not have the 
authority to legislate to protect the environment in the faraway state.223  
Instead, lawmakers should emphasize the local health, safety, and 
environmental benefits that are promoted by legislation supporting 
sustainable agriculture.224 
From 1992 to 2005, the Supreme Court decided “thirteen major 
dormant Commerce Clause cases,” ten of which invalidated the 
challenged state actions.225  During that period, however, two Supreme 
Court Justices evolved in their interpretation of the doctrine; both Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas have stood against the majority of the Court 
and voted to uphold state laws when they are not facially 
discriminatory.226  In fact, Justice Thomas appears to have rejected the 
doctrine altogether, even dissenting to the decision in Granholm v. 
Heald, which was admittedly discriminatory on its face, and later 
dismissing the doctrine outright as “hav[ing] no basis in the Constitution 
and . . . unworkable in practice.”227  Also notable, the Court has not 
 
220. Smith, supra note 13, at 1241.  But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 
(1968) (“We decline to void essentially on the ground that it . . . could be reenacted in its 
exact form if the same or another legislator made a ‘wiser’ speech about it.”). 
221. See supra note 130-132 and accompanying text. 
222. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) 
(explaining that states do not have the power to regulate the environment outside state borders 
because it is tantamount to regulating interstate commerce). 
223. Id. (“Clarkstown [may not] justify the flow control ordinance as a way to steer 
solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that it might deem harmful to the 
environment. To do so would extend the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional 
bounds.”). 
224. See supra Part I.D. 
225. David S. Day, The "Mature" Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
226. Id. at 51. 
227. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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invalidated any cases under the dormant Commerce Clause since 
Granholm v. Heald was decided in 2005.228  There are several new 
members of the Court since Granholm was decided,229 but the Justices 
most resistant to the dormant Commerce Clause, Justices Scalia and 
Justice Thomas, are still serving.230  It has yet to be seen how the new 
Roberts Court will approach dormant Commerce Clause issues. 
We may have a while to wait, since the Court has denied recent 
petitions for certiorari.231  With the inconsistent application of the 
doctrine in circuit courts, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will 
address the inconsistency eventually, and it is possible that we will see a 
trend that allows states to regulate in areas like sustainable agriculture 
without being pre-empted by Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.232 
CONCLUSION 
 The negative effects of industrialization can be mitigated when 
food is produced on small farms and distributed locally.  State and local 
governments should embrace policies that promote sustainability in 
agricultural production.  The federal government may have preemptive 
authority to regulate agriculture on the national level, but this is not a 
complete barrier to states that want to encourage sustainable practices.  
 
228. Few cases have gone before the Court since Granholm was decided, and 
challengers have not succeeded in any of them.  See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 
U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (upholding a tax on out-of-state bonds that did not apply to in-state 
bonds under the market participant exception); United Haulers Ass'n., 550 U.S. 330 
(upholding legislation that requires in-county disposal of waste at state run facilities under the 
market participant exception); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 
U.S. 429 (2005) (upholding an annual fee placed on intrastate haulers, even though strictly 
intrastate haulers are subject to the same fee as mixed haulers who do not receive the same 
benefits of intrastate commerce as their strictly intrastate counterparts). 
229. Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court in 2005, followed by Justice Samuel 
Alito in 2006, Justice Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, and Justice Elena Kagan in 2010.  See 
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited May 13, 2014). 
230. Id. 
231. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (2010), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 51 (2012). 
232. Compare Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a Massachusetts state statute favoring small wine producers over large producers 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause), and S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 
583 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a South Dakota state statute favoring small farms over 
incorporated farms violates the dormant Commerce Clause), with Black Star Farms LLC v. 
Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an Arizona statute favoring small wine 
producers over large producers does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause), and Coors 
Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 787 F. Supp. 2d 149, 172 (D.P.R. 2011), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 678 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a Puerto Rico statute favoring small 
beer producers over large producers does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause). 
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State and local governments have the ability to craft legislation that does 
not violate the principles of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Some forms 
of legislation are likely to prevail against a constitutional challenge, like 
programs that double the value of federal food stamps at farmers’ 
markets or programs that provide direct subsidies to small farms.  Other 
types of legislation, like differential tax treatment, may be less likely to 
survive, but the unpredictable nature of the dormant Commerce Clause 
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